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The Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (the ‘DDA’) provides protection for the 
rights of people with disabilities in Australia in many facets of everyday life. This 
paper examines the DDA in relation to the prevention of discrimination in the area of 
education. This is of relevance to tertiary institutions such as universities, given that 
de-institutionalisation and mainstreaming over the last decade particularly has 
resulted in many more disabled people seeking to continue their studies at the tertiary 
level.  
 
The DDA prevents educational institutions from discriminating against a student on 
the grounds of the student’s disability in relation to admission and access to the 
institution and its services and facilities. However, the DDA also provides that it is 
not unlawful to discriminate in relation to these matters if the disabled student’s 
requirements are such that an unjustifiable hardship would be imposed upon the 
educational institution. 
 
Over the last twelve years, the courts have decided individual complaints consistent 
with the broad principles established by the DDA. Particularly relevant is the recent 
case of Purvis v State of New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) 
[2003] HCA 62, which has tested the boundaries of the DDA with respect to the 
definition of “disability”, the “appropriate comparator” issue and the provision by the 
educational institution of “reasonable accommodations”. The cases of Hills Grammar 
School v HREOC and Purvis discuss the unjustifiable hardship defence with the Hills 
Grammar School case particularly, providing a detailed determination of what 
constitutes the defence for the purposes of the DDA. 
 
Legislative amendments to the DDA as a result of a recent review undertaken by the 
Productivity Commission, in addition to the introduction of new education standards, 
have clarified the obligations imposed upon educational institutions with regard to 
disabled students. Educational institutions must take those steps necessary to satisfy 
the requirements of the DDA, thus avoiding claims of unlawful discrimination being 
made against them.   
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The greatest barriers which people with a disability face in our community are 






This paper explores the application of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) 
(the ‘DDA’), with a particular focus on educational institutions, and on the issue of 
the application of the defence of unjustifiable hardship. The DDA prevents, among 
other things, an educational institution such as a university from discriminating 
against a student on the ground of the student’s disability, by refusing to enrol the 
student or by denying or limiting the student’s access to any benefit provided by the 
educational authority. The concept of unjustifiable hardship arises because the DDA 
further provides that an institution may seek to avoid any obligations under the Act if 
it can show that the adjustments that it might have to make to provide services and 
facilities for a disabled student may cause unjustifiable hardship for the institution. 
 
The DDA has recently been reviewed by the Federal Government Productivity 
Commission2 in its report (Review of the DDA 1992),3 the findings and 
recommendations of which in part, are highlighted throughout this report. The 
outcome of this review and the recent drafting of disability standards for education 
(the education standards) are of particular relevance to educational institutions. 
 
The first part of this paper addresses discrimination generally; how it is defined, its 
types and the various factors which constitute its makeup. Following this part is a 
brief overview of the exemptions to unlawful discrimination including, and with a 
particular focus on the defence of unjustifiable hardship. Finally this paper examines 
some recent developments which have occurred in this area of law. 
 
The United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Disabled Persons (1978) provides 
that all individuals with disabilities have a right, amongst other things, to protection 
from discriminatory treatment in the area of education, and assistance to enable them 
to become as self-reliant as possible.4 The DDA implemented the Australian 
Government’s obligations as a signatory to this declaration5 when the Act was passed 
in 1992 and came into effect in March 1993.  
 
                                                 
1 Commissioner Graeme Innes, Finney v The Hills Grammar School [1999] HREOCA 14 at para. 
6.14. 
2 The Productivity Commission is an independent agency and the Government’s principal review and 
advisory body on microeconomic policy and regulation. The DDA was reviewed in April, 2004. 
3 Productivity Commission Inquiry Report, Volume 1: Chapters, Report No. 30, 30 April 2004 
(‘Productivity Commission Report’). 
4 The declaration is attached to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) 
at Schedule 5. 
5 The Australian Government lacks specific power to legislate regarding human rights, disability or 
discrimination. It does have power over external affairs however, which includes legislating to 
implement treaties and on matters of international concern (Productivity Commission Report, 1). 
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The DDA and various State anti-discrimination laws6 in Australia reflect this 
declaration by providing in general terms that discrimination on the basis of physical, 
intellectual, psychiatric, sensory, and neurological and learning disability is unlawful. 
The DDA and the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) 
largely provide the Federal framework for the protection of the rights of people with 
disabilities in Australia.7
 
The DDA has been amended since its inception and continues to evolve. It operates at 
a fairly high level of principle by making discrimination on the ground of disability 
unlawful in certain areas, but it does not provide much detail on how the law should 
be applied in individual cases. Over time the courts have decided individual 
complaints consistent with the broad principles set by the DDA.8  
 
The environment in which the DDA operates has changed over the past 11 years with 
‘de-institutionalisation’9 and ‘mainstreaming’10 exposing many people with 
disabilities to new opportunities and challenges and likewise exposing many parts of 
the general community to people with disabilities. Of importance is the fact that there 
is a generation of children with disabilities moving through the mainstream education 
system who will soon be seeking possible higher education opportunities.11
 
 
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE DDA? 
 
Section 3 of the DDA sets out the objects of the Act. These are: 
 
a) To eliminate, as far as possible, discrimination against persons on the 
ground of disability in the areas of: 
(i) work, accommodation, education, access to premises, clubs and 
sport; and 
(ii) the provision of goods, facilities, services and land; and 
(iii) existing laws; and 
(iv) the administration of Commonwealth laws and programs; and 
 
b) to ensure, as far as practicable, that persons with disabilities have the same 
rights to equality before the law as the rest of the community; and 
c) to promote recognition and acceptance within the community of the 
principle that persons with disabilities have the same fundamental rights as 
the rest of the community. 
 
                                                 
6 Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) Div. 4.5, Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) Part 4A, Anti-
Discrimination Act (NT) s 24, Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 7, Equal Opportunity Act 1984 
(SA) part 5, Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) Div. 5, Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic) s 37, Equal 
Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) s 66A. 
7 Australian and New Zealand Equal Opportunity Law and Practice (1998) 1, 344.940 at 7.370. 
8 Productivity Commission Report, 2. 
9 This refers to a shift from institution-based to community-based care of people with disabilities. 
10 This refers to a shift from services that cater separately and exclusively for people with particular 
types of disability to those that cater for the ‘mainstream’ population. 
11 Productivity Commission Report, 2. 
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There is therefore an attempt to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate 
for the elimination of discrimination and to bring people with disabilities into the 
economic and social mainstream of Australian life.12
 
 
HOW DOES THE DDA APPLY TO EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS SUCH 
AS UNIVERSITIES? 
 
Educational institutions13 are bound by the DDA under section 22 of the Act which 
provides that it is unlawful for an educational authority to discriminate against a 
person on the ground of the person’s disability in relation to: 
 
Admission 
• Refusal or failure to accept an application for admission from a person 
with a disability;14 or 
• Accepting a person with a disability as a student on less favourable terms 
or conditions than others. For example, asking a potential student with a 




• Denying or limiting access to people with a disability. For example, not 
allowing a person to attend excursions or join in school sports, delivering 
lectures in an inaccessible format, inaccessible student common rooms; or 
• Expelling a person because of a disability; or 




• Humiliating comments or actions about a person’s disability, such as 
insults, or comments or actions which create a hostile environment. 
 
However, section 22 (4) of the DDA provides that it is not unlawful to refuse or fail to 
accept a person’s application for admission as a student at an educational institution 
where the person would require services or facilities that are not required by students 
                                                 
12 Australian and New Zealand Equal Opportunity Law and Practice (2001) 1, 344.940 at 7.420. 
13 In all jurisdictions except Tasmania, a reference to an ‘educational institution’ means ‘a school, 
college, university or other institution at which education or training is provided’. 
14 International students are covered by the DDA. However the operation of the Migration Act 1958 
(Cth) is exempt from the provisions of most of the DDA and thus discrimination can legally occur with 
respect to the granting of visas. The Migration Act 1958 (Cth) requires a frank disclosure of any 
relevant factors by a student applying for a visa. The officer who determines the outcome of the visa 
application is required to consider the public interest (primarily on an economic basis) in making a 
determination and thus may reject an application on the basis of a medical report which indicates a 
disability which may involve costly accommodations. Such rejection would not be considered 
discriminatory. Nevertheless international students with disabilities do apply for student visas and are 
granted those visas and the moment the student enters Australia, the provisions of the DDA are 
available to the student. Likewise an international student may develop a disability whilst studying in 
Australia and the university is prevented from discriminating against that student on the grounds of the 
disability. C. Stickels & R. Guthrie, ‘Do International Students with Disabilities get ‘A Fair Go’ at 
Australia’s Universities?’ Working Paper Series 95.07, Curtin Business School, June 1995. 
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who do not have a disability, and the provision of which would impose ‘unjustifiable 
hardship’ on the educational institution. The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission (‘HREOC’) asserts that large publicly funded organisations such as 
universities may find it difficult to establish a defence based on unjustifiable hardship. 
However even large institutions such as government instrumentalities have been able 
to show that unjustifiable hardship will occur through significant financial 
expenditure.15
 
In order to understand the application of the principles that promote human rights and 
equality for people with disabilities in the context of education, it is necessary to 
elaborate on various issues which underpin discrimination legislation in Australia.  
 
 
WHAT IS DISCRIMINATION? 
 
Generally speaking, discrimination is any practice that makes distinctions between 
individuals or groups so as to disadvantage some and advantage others. Motive and 
intention to discriminate are irrelevant to the fact of discrimination.16 This was 
illustrated in the case of Hills Grammar School v Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission,17 where the appellant school admitted directly 
discriminating against a student Scarlett Finney, who suffered from spina bifida, by 
refusing to enrol her. The school sought to apply the defence of unjustifiable hardship 
on the ground that the accommodations and adjustments that were necessary to 
support the student’s enrolment would constitute such hardship on the school. In 
making this assessment, the school’s administration made enquiries about the needs of 
children with spina bifida generally, but did not look at the specific needs of Scarlett 
Finney herself. The school did not necessarily intend to discriminate against Scarlett, 
but in failing to look at the specific needs of the particular child the defence failed and 
the school was found liable for unlawful discrimination.  
 
This issue was also tested in the case of X v McHugh, Auditor General for the State of 
Tasmania18 where the HREOC found that the dismissal of an employee suffering 
from paranoid schizophrenia constituted discrimination on the ground of disability 
notwithstanding that the employer was unaware of the complainant’s disability. The 
Commission found: 
 
But that is not the test. Intention or motive is not required, as the High Court has 
said. The objective of the Act is to eliminate, as far as possible, discrimination 
against persons on the ground of disability in areas of public life; it therefore 
proscribes, not merely deliberate discrimination, but thoughtless discrimination 
                                                 
15 See Ellis v Metropolitan Transit Authority (1988) EOC 92-232. 
16 See Waters v Public Transport Corporation (1991) 173 CLR 349. Also see Garity v Commonwealth 
Bank of Australia [1999] EOC 92-966 where Commissioner Nettlefold stated; ‘The effect of an 
impugned practice, not the underlying intent, is the governing factor in determining whether the 
practice gave rise to discrimination. Intent to discriminate is not a necessary element of discrimination 
… The task is to determine whether the ‘true’ basis of the employer’s conduct is or was grounded on 
the prescribed consideration … The test to be applied is objective, in the sense that it is necessary to 
show no more than that, because of the aggrieved person’s disability, she received the less favourable 
treatment.’ Ibid 79 129. 
17 [2000] EOC 93-081. 
18 (1994) EOC 92-623. 
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as well. Employers are required to be vigilant in their regard for circumstances 
affecting the interests of their employees, I agree, at least in the circumstances of 
this case with the interpretation of the Act advanced by Counsel for the 
respondent, namely, that s 5 is about objective discrimination. It is not necessary 
that an employer know of the existence of the disability. It is enough if an 
employer is shown to have discriminated because of a manifestation of a 
disability.19
 
The essence of discrimination is such that it requires some type of comparison. This is 
discussed below (see ‘The requirement to compare’). The onus of proving 
discrimination rests with the complainant.20 Once it has been established that 
discrimination has occurred, the onus moves from the complainant to the respondent 
who may seek to prove that the discrimination was lawful under the relevant Act.21
 
 
GROUNDS FOR DISCRIMINATION 
 
Anti-discrimination legislation in Australia makes it unlawful to discriminate on 
specific grounds. Unless a person is allegedly being discriminated against on a ground 
as specified in legislation, there is no unlawful discrimination. Under Commonwealth 
legislation there is a separate Act for each ground of discrimination; that is, disability, 
sex (including marital status and pregnancy) and race. Each State and Territory has 
one Act under which it is unlawful to discriminate on a number of grounds. These 
vary from State to State, but all include reference to disability or impairment. 
 
 
WHAT IS A ‘DISABILITY’? 
 
There are some differences between the legislative definitions of ‘disability’ and 
‘impairment’. The term ‘disability’ is defined in the DDA22 in the following terms: 
 
a) Total or partial loss of the person’s bodily or mental functions (e.g., being 
paraplegic, having epilepsy); 
b) Total or partial loss of a part of the body (e.g., amputations); 
c) The presence in the body of organisms causing disease or illness (e.g., 
having AIDS or hepatitis); 
d) The presence in the body of organisms capable of causing disease or 
illness (e.g., being HIV positive but not having full-blown AIDS); 
e) The malfunction, malformation or disfigurement of a part of the person’s 
body (e.g., having a sight impairment, having a club foot, having a 
harelip); 
f) A disorder or malfunction that results in the person learning differently 
from a person without the disorder or malfunction (e.g., being dyslexic); 
                                                 
19 Australian and New Zealand Equal Opportunity Law and Practice (2002) 1, 4.320 .42. 
20 Scott & Anor v Telstra [1995] EOC 92-717. 
21 L. Basser & M. Jones, ‘The Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth): A Three-Dimensional 
Approach to Operationalising Human Rights’ (2002) 26 (2) Melbourne University Law Review, 
Symposium, Contemporary Human Rights in Australia 267. (‘A Three-Dimensional Approach to 
Operationalising Human Rights’). 
22 Section 4. 
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g) A disorder, illness or disease that affects a person’s thought processes, 
perception of reality, emotions or judgment or that results in disturbed 
behaviour (e.g., having schizophrenia, having Alzheimer’s disease, having 
a psychiatric condition). 
 
The DDA has the most comprehensive definition of the term ‘disability’ and also has 
the widest application in Australia. The legislation of the majority of States and both 
Territories contain a very similar definition to that of the DDA, although not as broad. 
Unlike some counterpart State legislation,23 the DDA defines disability so as to 
include people who currently have a disability, people who previously had, but no 
longer have a disability (e.g., having a medical history of severe asthma which is now 
under control), people for whom a disability may exist in the future (e.g., being a 
member of a family which has a history of heart disease) and people to whom a 
disability is imputed (e.g., assuming that a gay man has AIDS when he is in fact quite 
healthy).24
 
Additionally, under section 8 of the DDA, the definition of disability discrimination 
includes less favourable treatment because a person is accompanied by an interpreter, 
reader, assistant or carer. Guide dogs, wheelchairs and palliative or therapeutic 
devices that disabled persons may need are also addressed by the Commonwealth and 
State legislation.25  
 
This definition of disability ensures that the DDA covers all types of disability, thus 
placing the focus of the DDA on the alleged act of the discriminator and not on the 
nature of the person’s disability.26
 
 
BEHAVIOUR AS A MANIFESTATION OF DISABILITY 
 
A contentious issue in relation to the definition of disability is the interpretation of 
paragraph (g) of section 4 with reference to the extent to which a distinction is drawn 
between a disability and its manifestations.27 The issue seems to have been settled for 
the time being as a result of the High Court decision in Purvis v State of New South 
Wales (Department of Education and Training),28 where the court considered whether 
the definition of disability in paragraph (g) refers only to the underlying disorder 
suffered, or whether it includes the behavioural manifestations of that disorder. The 
Chief Justice observed that the problem with regard to the definition of disability 
arose partly because: 
 
                                                 
23 Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia, Queensland and Northern Territory do not provide for 
the ‘future existence’ of disabilities. 
24 All examples are taken from Australian and New Zealand Equal Opportunity Law and Practice 
(2001) 1, 344.940 at 7.422. 
25 Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) s 7, 9; Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) s 9; Anti-
Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) s 49B (3); Anti-Discrimination Act 1992 (NT) s 21; Anti-
Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 4; Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (SA) s S66 (d) (ii), (e); Anti-
Discrimination Act 1988 (Tas) s 3; Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) s 66A (4). 
26 Productivity Commission Report, 47. 
27 Federal Discrimination Law (2004), Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 99. 
28 (2003) HCA 62. 
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par (g) begins by reference to physical conditions and then adds a reference to a 
consequence (‘disturbed behaviour’) of a condition. It is necessary to relate par 
(g), with its added reference to resulting behaviour, to the provisions of s 5 as to 
what amounts to discrimination.29
 
The case involved Daniel Hoggan, the foster child of Mr and Mrs Purvis. Daniel was 
enrolled in a mainstream Year 7 class at Grafton High School in New South Wales in 
1997. Daniel had multiple, complex disabilities due to a severe brain injury received 
as an infant. During 1997, he was disciplined and suspended on several occasions for 
verbal and physical abuse of teachers, teachers’ aides and other students. The school 
recommended Daniel be moved to a special education unit. 
 
The NSW Department of Education rejected an appeal from Mr and Mrs Purvis 
against the move to a special education unit. The Purvis’s made a disability 
discrimination complaint to the HREOC which found in their favour and the case then 
proceeded through the courts on appeal. The steps in this process were as follows: 
 
• HREOC found the Department of Education had discriminated against 
Daniel on the ground of his behaviour and therefore on the ground of his 
disability.30 
• The Federal Court at first instance disagreed with the HREOC. It said ‘the 
behaviour of the complainant is not ipso facto a manifestation of a 
disability within the meaning of the Act’.31 
• The Full Court of the Federal Court agreed with the first Federal Court 
decision. It said Daniel’s ‘conduct was a consequence of the disability 
rather than any part of the disability within the meaning of s 4 of the Act’. 
That is, Daniel’s behaviour was separate to his disability, even though it 
was caused by his disability.32 
• The High Court said Daniel’s conduct was part of his disability for the 
purposes of the DDA because it was ‘disturbed behaviour’ under part (g) 
of the definition. The High Court said the Federal Court had erred in 
distinguishing between a condition and its behavioural manifestations.  
 
…to focus on the cause of the behaviour, to the exclusion of the resulting 
behaviour, would confine the operation of the Act by excluding from 
consideration that attribute of the disabled person (here, disturbed behaviour) 
which makes that person different in the eyes of others.33
 
That is, direct discrimination on the ground of a behaviour that is a consequence of a 
disability is discrimination on the ground of the disability.34  
 
However, the majority of the High Court went on to find that the Department of 
Education had not unlawfully discriminated against Daniel because of his disability 
                                                 
29 Gleeson CJ at 4. 
30 Purvis v The State of New South Wales (Department of Education), HREOC, 2000. 
31 State of NSW (Department of Education) v HREOC [2001] FCA 1199. 
32 Purvis v State of NSW (Department of Education and Training) [2002] FCAFC 106. 
33 Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ at 212. 
34 Purvis v State of NSW (Department of Education and Training)[(2003] HCA 62. 
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when it suspended then expelled him from school by reason of his behaviour (also see 
‘The requirement to compare’ below with regards to this case): 
 
It may be accepted … that the term ‘disability’ includes functional disorders, 
such as incapacity, or a diminished capacity to control behaviour. At it may be 
also accepted … that the disturbed behaviour of the pupil that resulted from his 
disorder was an aspect of his disability. However, it is necessary to be more 
concrete in relating par (g) of the definition of disability to s 5. The 
circumstances that gave rise ... to the treatment, by way of suspension and 
expulsion, of the pupil, was his propensity to engage in serious acts of violence 
towards other pupils and members of the staff. In his case, that propensity 
resulted from a disorder; but such a propensity could also exist in pupils without 
any disorder. What, for him, was disturbed behaviour, might be, for another 
pupil, bad behaviour … The circumstances are relevantly the same, in terms of 
treatment, when that person engages in violent behaviour … There are pupils 
who have no disorder, and are not disturbed, who behave in a violent manner 
towards others. They would probably be suspended, and, if the conduct 
persisted, expelled, in less time than the pupil in this case.35
 
A similar approach to the interpretation of the definition of disability was taken in an 
earlier decision in Randell v Consolidated Bearing Company.36 In that matter, the 
applicant had a mild dyslexic learning difficulty and complained of discrimination 
when he was dismissed as a result of poor work performance. Raphael FM stated:  
 
In my view there is no distinction between this applicant’s ‘disability’ and its 
‘manifestation’. His ‘disorder’ resulted in his ‘learning differently’. He learned 
more slowly. He was dismissed because he was learning too slowly.37
 
Raphael FM found that the failure of the respondent to provide the assistance to the 
applicant which was available to improve his work performance and which had been 
made available to staff in the past, and his subsequent dismissal, constituted disability 
discrimination. This decision was referred to with approval by McHugh and Kirby JJ 
in the Purvis case in finding that the HREOC was correct in determining that Daniel 
Hoggan’s behaviour was a manifestation of his disability and therefore part of his 
disability for the purposes of section 4. 
 
 
DIRECT AND INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION 
 




Section 5 of the DDA provides: 
 
(1)  For the purposes of this Act, a person (discriminator) discriminates against 
another person (aggrieved person) on the ground of a disability of the 
                                                 
35 Gleeson CJ at 11. 
36 [2002] FMCA 44.  
37 [2002] FMCA 44, [48]. 
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aggrieved person if, because of the aggrieved person’s disability, the 
discriminator treats or proposes to treat the aggrieved person less 
favourably than, in circumstances that are the same or are not materially 
different, the discriminator treats or would treat a person without the 
disability.  
 
(2)  For the purposes of subsection (1), circumstances in which a person treats 
or would treat another person with a disability are not materially different 
because of the fact that different accommodation or services may be 
required by the person with a disability.  
 
Most anti-discrimination statutes define direct discrimination in a similar fashion with 
some variations in the wording. Direct discrimination is generally described in most 
statutes as occurring when an aggrieved person is treated less favourably, by reason of 
a prohibited ground, attribute or characteristic, when compared to the treatment of 
another person without the ground, attribute or characteristic, in the same or not 
materially different circumstances.  
 
For direct discrimination, there must be a connection between the less favourable 
treatment and the ground, attribute or characteristic of the aggrieved person. Different 
anti-discrimination statutes adopt different expressions in reference to this connection. 
For example, the DDA refers to less favourable treatment being ‘because of’ the 
disability of the aggrieved person. In Western Australia the expression ‘on the ground 
of’ is used and in Victoria the expression ‘on the basis of’ is used.38
 
THE REQUIREMENT TO COMPARE 
 
Section s 5 (1) of the DDA requires a comparison to be made between the manner in 
which a person with a disability is treated and the manner in which a person without 
the disability is treated.39 Additionally, section 6 (a) of the DDA which deals with 
indirect discrimination (see below), requires identification of a pool of persons with 
whom the aggrieved person can be compared. The person without the disability is 
often referred to as the ‘comparator’. The issue of an appropriate comparator is a 
complex one, and whilst the law appears to be settled in this area by reason of the 
decision of the High Court in Purvis (this aspect discussed below), the issue of the 
                                                 
38 Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) s 66A, Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) s 5, Anti-
Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) s 49B, Anti-Discrimination Act (NT) s 19, Anti-Discrimination Act 
1991(Qld) s 8, Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (SA) s 66, Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic) s 7, 
Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) s 8.  
39 Section 5 (1) of the DDA. The Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) at s 8 refers to ‘unfavourable 
treatment’ of a person because they have an attribute covered by the Act. Unlike other anti-
discrimination Acts throughout Australia, this term does not invite a comparison between the way in 
which a person who has a particular attribute is treated compared with a person without that attribute or 
who has a different attribute. All that is required is an examination of the treatment accorded the 
aggrieved person or the conditions imposed upon the aggrieved person. If the consequence is 
unfavourable for the aggrieved person, or if the condition imposed would disadvantage that person, 
there is discrimination where the treatment is given or the condition is imposed because of the relevant 
attribute possessed by that person. This interpretation was given in the case of Prezzi v Discrimination 
Commissioner & Anor (1996) EOC 92. However the ACT’s Discrimination Commissioner has 
acknowledged that most often there is still an implied comparator used for the purposes of determining 
whether someone has been treated unfavourably (Australian and New Zealand Equal Opportunity Law 
and Practice (1998) 1, 344.940).  
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selection of an appropriate comparator in a given case is likely to remain a 
contentious one. 
 
In a review of Federal Court discrimination cases heard in the period September 2000 
to September 2002, the HREOC concluded: 
 
The issue of how an appropriate comparator is chosen in a particular case has 
been a complicated and vexed one since the inception of the DDA, and one that 
continues to be the subject of academic and judicial debate.40
 
Identification of an appropriate comparator for the DDA is infinitely more 
complicated than for other Federal legislation such as the Sex Discrimination Act 
1984 (Cth) and the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) where many more 
comparators and comparative situations are usually available.41 Some of the problems 
with the comparator have arisen from practical difficulties in identifying 
circumstances that are ‘the same or not materially different’.42 Various HREOC and 
Court decisions have taken different approaches to interpreting circumstances ‘that 
are not materially different’ and the characteristics that should therefore be imputed to 
the real or hypothetical comparator.43  
 
The history of Purvis44 illustrates the complex nature in identifying an appropriate 
comparator. At first instance, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commissioner found that the comparator was another student at the school in the 
same year but without the disability, including without the associated behaviour. The 
Full Court of the Federal Court and the High Court rejected this comparator. 
However, the High Court was divided on this issue. The majority of the High Court 
said the circumstances for comparison included disruptive behaviour; that is the 
comparator was a student without the disability who behaved in a similarly ‘violent’ 
manner, for reasons other than disability. Gleeson CJ stated: 
 
The circumstances to which s 5 directs attention as the same circumstances 
would involve violent conduct on the part of another pupil who is not 
manifesting disturbed behaviour resulting from a disorder … The required 
comparison is with a pupil without the disability; not a pupil without the 
violence.45
 
In essence, the majority of the High Court distinguished between two types of 
behaviour that seemed outwardly identical and that had the same disturbing or 
harmful effect on others, but that had different causes:  
 
• ‘disturbed’ behaviour that was a manifestation or symptom of a disability; 
and 
                                                 
40 HREOC 2003b, 70. 
41 Productivity Commission Report, 307-308. 
42 Productivity Commission Report 309. 
43 For HREOC interpretations see IW v City of Perth & Ors (1997) 191 CLR 1 and McKenzie v Dept of 
Urban Services & Canberra Hospital (2001) FMCA 20. Cases that did not follow HREOC 
interpretation include NSW v HREOC & Purvis (2001) FCA 1199 and Minns v State of NSW (2002). 
FMCA 44 (Productivity Commission Report, 309). 
44 See brief facts of case at ‘behaviour as a manifestation of disability’. 
45 (2003) 202 ALR 133, 137 [11]. 
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• ‘wilful’ behaviour that was not related to a disability.46 
 
The majority finding of no direct discrimination rested largely on its view that the 
comparator was a (hypothetical) student exhibiting ‘wilful’ behaviour similar in 
outward appearance to Daniel’s ‘disturbed’ behaviour.47
 
The Productivity Commission observes that the majority view appears to imply that 
different treatment of a person with a disability on the ground of the behaviour caused 
by their disability cannot constitute direct discrimination under the DDA, and if this 
approach were extended to other manifestations of disability (for example, to non-
behavioural symptoms or limitations caused by a disability), the scope of the direct 
discrimination provisions could be significantly narrowed.48
 
The minority of the High Court argued that if disruptive behaviour was, in effect, part 
of Daniel’s disability (which all members of the High Court agreed it was), then it 
could not also be imputed to the comparator.49
 
One commentator expressed concern as to the majority view asserting that the 
significant differences in a student’s ability to control their behaviour had been 
overlooked in the circumstances of the comparison.50 She stated: 
 
a person without a disability who exhibits the kind of anti-social behaviour that 
goes on in Purvis is doing a deliberate act. They are acting up and acting out in 
response to authority or against authority. The person with a disability like the 
complainant in Purvis is acting in a way that they actually have no control over 
… the problem in Purvis is if you don’t analyse why the young man is behaving 
[disruptively] - if you simply compare behaviours, you’d have to say it was fair 
enough to expel him from school. You can’t come to any other conclusion.51
 
Purvis demonstrates the practical importance of identifying the correct comparator 
and circumstances for comparison in determining direct discrimination.52
 
The issue of the requirement of an appropriate comparator for the purposes of section 
5 of the DDA was also raised in the case of A School v HREOC & Anor53 In this case, 
the student (AJ), suffered from a disability which resulted in lengthy absences from 
school and the inability to climb stairs to attend certain classrooms. It was alleged that 
the school, in providing educational services to AJ engaged in direct discrimination 
by treating AJ less favourably than other students without a disability, in that she was 
not provided with adequate work or supervision during those periods of absences. 
Mansfield J held that the HREOC in its original finding that the school directly 
discriminated against the student (AJ): 
 
                                                 
46 Productivity Commission Report, 309. 
47 Productivity Commission Report, 309. 
48 Productivity Commission Report, 310. 
49 Productivity Commission Report, 309. 
50 Submission to the Productivity Commission; Lee Ann Basser is a Barrister and Solicitor of the 
Supreme Court of Victoria and senior lecturer in law at La Trobe University. 
51 Productivity Commission Report, 310 (Transcript. P. 2735). 
52 Productivity Commission Report, 309.  
53 [1998] 1437 FCA. 
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did not properly assess the conduct of the school by the comparison which s 5 
dictated … They do not identify how the school’s treatment of AJ was different 
from that accorded to other students. They do not … discuss what would have 
been accorded to other students without her disability; in the same or similar 
circumstances … The Commission found that AJ nevertheless had a clear need 
for one or two persons to be available to her for such care as a personal priority. 
The reasons do not proceed to address whether such support was, or would have 
been, provided to other students in the same or similar circumstances and do not 
address whether one reason for the school treating AJ differently, if it did was 
by reason of her disability. 
 
Thus the finding by the Commission that the school had directly discriminated against 
the student in the provision of education services (contrary to section 22) was set 
aside by Mansfield J on the basis that the HREOC did not properly address the 




Under section 6 of the DDA, and the Anti-Discrimination Acts of NSW and Qld, and 
the Equal Opportunity Acts of Victoria, SA and WA,54 indirect discrimination on the 
ground of a disability occurs where: 
 
a person (discriminator) discriminates against another person (aggrieved person) 
on the ground of a disability of the aggrieved person if the discriminator requires 
the aggrieved person to comply with a requirement or condition:55
 
(a)  with which a substantially higher proportion of persons without the 
disability comply or are able to comply; and  
(b)  which is not reasonable having regard to the circumstances of the 
case; and  
(c)  with which the aggrieved person does not or is not able to comply.  
 
Section 6 makes it clear that all four of these aspects are cumulative.56
 
Generally, indirect discrimination occurs when policies and practices which appear to 
be neutral result in a person/group being affected.57 Bowen CJ and Gummow J in the 
case of The Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade v. Styles & Anor 
(1988) EOC 92-239 described it as ‘practices which are fair in form and intention but 
discriminatory in impact and outcome’. The nature of indirect discrimination is such 
that it can occur without any intention to disadvantage a particular group or 
                                                 
54 Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) s 49B (1) (b); Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 11; Equal 
Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic) s 9; Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (SA) s 66 (b); Equal Opportunity Act 
1984 (WA) s 66A (3). Indirect discrimination is specifically prohibited by the DDA and by equal 
opportunity legislation in all States and in the ACT. Whilst not specifically set out in the NT 
legislation, indirect discrimination is nevertheless intended to be included under the Act at the time of 
drafting. 
55 ‘having regard to the objects of the Act, it is clear that the words “requirement or condition” should 
be construed broadly so as to cover any form of qualification or pre-requisite’, Australian Iron & Steel 
Pty Ltd v Banovic [1989] HCA 56 Dawson J at 10.  
56 W v Flinders University of South Australia [1998] HREOCA 19 Commissioner McEvoy at 6.4. 
57 R. Guthrie, Laws Relating to Safety, Compensation and Equality in Employment (2003) 238. 
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individual. The courts will determine if indirect discrimination has occurred by 
judging the effects of a policy or practice rather than the actual intent or motive of the 
alleged discriminator.58 Indirect discrimination is as unlawful as direct discrimination; 
the principle difference is that in indirect discrimination the focus shifts from the 
behaviour of the alleged discriminator to the impact of their action.59  
 
‘SUBSTANTIALLY HIGHER PROPORTION’ 
 
Section 6 (a) of the DDA requires consideration of whether or not a substantially 
higher proportion of persons without the disability of the aggrieved person comply or 
are able to comply with the requirement or condition. Therefore, a crucial element in 
any claim of indirect discrimination will be identification of a pool of persons with 
whom the aggrieved person can be compared.60
 
In the context of sex discrimination cases brought under State legislation and the 
former provisions of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth)61 (‘SDA’), a number of 
decisions have considered the manner in which such a comparison is to take place. In 
the Australian Iron and Steel case, a majority of the High Court held that it was 
necessary to first identify a ‘base group’ or ‘pool’ which will then ‘enable the 
proportions of complying men and women to be calculated’.62 In this case, the 
retrenchment policy that was held to be discriminatory was the ‘last on, first off’ 
policy of the employer. While on the face of it the policy appeared neutral, the effect 
of past discriminatory hiring practices whereby employment of women was delayed 
in preference to men meant that a higher proportion of the female members of the 
workforce than males were retrenched. The High Court held that the relevant 
proportions for comparison were the number of men who could comply as a 
proportion of all relevant men and the number of women who could comply as a 
proportion of all relevant women. 
 
Determining the appropriate pool will vary according to the nature and context of the 
case and very few cases have considered this issue under the DDA. This may be 
because in the context of physical disability particularly, compliance or non-
compliance with a requirement or condition (such as the use of stairs), is a matter 
easily accepted without the need for complex comparisons or statistical information.63
 
This aspect was illustrated in the case of Minns v New South Wales.64 The 
complainant was a student at two State high schools and alleged that those schools 
indirectly discriminated against him on the basis of his disability, by requiring that he 
comply with its disciplinary policy and subsequently suspending and expelling him. 
He claimed that he was unable to comply with the requirement or condition imposed 
in the form of the disciplinary policy due to his disabilities (Asperger’s syndrome, 
ADHD and Conduct disorder). 
                                                 
58 R. Guthrie, Laws Relating to Safety, Compensation and Equality in Employment (2003) 239. 
59 A Three-Dimensional Approach to Operationalising Human Rights, 264. 
60 Federal Discrimination Law 2004, HREOC, 116. 
61 Note that the provisions of the SDA and the DDA were previously in the same terms in relation to 
indirect discrimination. However the SDA was amended to insert the current s 5 (2), which does not 
provide for the comparison equivalent to s 6 (a) of the DDA. 
62 (1989) 168 CLR 165, 178 (Deane and Gaudron JJ). 
63 Federal Discrimination Law 2004, HREOC, 116. 
64 [2002] FMCA 60. 
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In considering the issue of the comparison as required by s 6 (a), Raphael FM stated: 
 
The applicant submits that the requirement contained in s 6 (a) with which a 
substantially higher proportion of persons without the disability comply or are 
able to comply is satisfied by comparing Ryan’s situation with that of all the 
other students in his cohort. Ryan’s disabilities and in particular the disability of 
conduct disorder makes it impossible for him to behave in a manner compliant 
with the discipline policy. The respondent argues that this form of comparison 
whilst it found favour with the Full Court of the Federal Court in Department of 
Foreign Affairs v Styles (1989) 88 ALR 621 was undermined by the decision of 
the High Court in Australian Iron and Steel v Banovic (1987) 168 CLR 165. The 
very sophisticated test required in Banovic was discussed by Sackville J in 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v HREOC (1998) 150 ALR 1 where he said 
at [40] in reference to Banovic: 
 
The case authoritatively establishes that the word ‘proportion’ used in s.24 (3) 
(a) of the Anti Discrimination Act (equivalent to s.5 (2) (a) of the SD Act) 
requires more than a mere numerical comparison. That proposition is not in 
question in this case. Banovich (sic) is, however, important in the present 
context because of the comments of the majority (Dean, Dawson and Gauldron 
JJ) on the selection of the base groups for the purposes of the comparison 
required by s.5 (2) (a) of the SD Act.’ 
 
The respondent submits that no attempt to properly define the base group was 
made. The respondent argues that no calculation of the persons to whom the 
requirement or condition applies in order to determine the initial pool was made. 
There was no division between people without the disability and people with the 
disability so that the denominator could be identified as those to whom the 
requirement applied and the numerator being those who actually comply. It is 
argued that the proper course to take is for the two fractions to be compared to 
calculate whether the group with the disability are disproportionately 
represented in the impact of the requirement or condition.  
 
The approach taken in Banovic and Commonwealth Bank are required in cases 
where it is necessary to tease out actual discrimination which is not evident at 
first blush being the result of: 
 
‘Practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in practice.’  
 
The respondent’s submissions are well taken. It is for the applicant to prove his 
case and if that requires a complex, time consuming and undoubtedly expensive 
exercise in comparisons then it must be undertaken. It should be noted that the 
cases as quoted by the respondent in support of the complex comparisons are 
sex discrimination cases (Banovic, Commonwealth Bank v HREOC, Bogle v 
Metropolitan Health Service Board (2002) EOC 93-069, Bonella & Ors v 
Wollongong City Council (2002) EOC 93-183). There are no cases dealing with 




‘Section 6(a) on the other hand contemplates a situation where discrimination 
operates indirectly. One example of such indirect discrimination would be 
requiring a complainant to act in a way that was made impossible by a person’s 
disability. Thus an illustration of conduct that might fall within s.6 (a), based on 
the facts in the present case, would be the situation where the school expelled 
the complainant because he continued to swear and demonstrate violent 
behaviour.’ 
 
In making that observation Emmett J did not appear to be troubled by fitting the 
applicant into a pool. There is no evidence in this case that any one else suffered 
Ryan’s disabilities although it is known from the evidence of the teachers and of 
the school records placed in evidence that the majority of students in Ryan’s 
classes did comply with the policies. No evidence was produced by the 
respondent that any members of Ryan’s classes were unable to comply with the 
policies apart from Ryan.65
 
It would appear that the approach in Banovic should be regarded as the correct one, 
but in practice it may be that the comparison required is in fact a reasonably simple 
one (such as in Minns).66
 
‘REQUIREMENT NOT REASONABLE’ 
 
The DDA does not define ‘reasonable’ for the purposes of section 6 (b). However, 
reasonableness is a well-established legal concept.67 In Clarke v Catholic Education 
Office68, Madgwick J stated: 
 
Reasonableness is to be determined having regard to all the circumstances of the 
case. These include but are not limited to: 
 
• the nature and extent of the effect of the discriminatory requirement 
or condition; 
• the reasons advanced in favour of it; 
• the possibility of alternative action; and 
• matters of ‘effectiveness, efficiency and convenience’. 
 
In this case, a student with a severe hearing impairment enrolled at a Catholic 
secondary college. The student, Jacob Clarke, depended on the Auslan signing system 
to understand language and communication and the learning support model proposed 
by the college did not include the services of an Auslan interpreter. The parents 
claimed the school had indirectly discriminated against Jacob when they established a 
rule or expectation with which Jacob was not able to comply. To attend the school, 
receive instruction and participate in the full quality of the educational experience, it 
was proposed in this case, that the school expected Jacob to understand spoken 
English. Jacob’s reliance on Auslan for communication and social interactions meant 
                                                 
65 [2002] FMCA 60, [254] at 250-254. 
66 Federal Discrimination Law 2004, HREOC, 118. 
67 Productivity Commission Report, 49. 
68 (2003) 202 ALR 340, [51]. 
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he was not able to comply with the school’s expectation. To determine a case of 
indirect discrimination, Madgwick J had to decide: 
 
• whether a student with total hearing loss since birth was unable to comply 
with a requirement established by the school on enrolment that the student 
should be able to ‘participate in and receive instruction without the 
assistance of an interpreter’; and 
• that a substantial proportion of the students who do not have the disability 
were able to comply; and 
• that the requirement made by the school was not reasonable; and 
• that Jacob was not able to comply. 
 
Thus, the condition of enrolment established by the college was that Jacob and his 
parents accept a model of support that did not include Auslan. This requirement 
established the expectation that attendance at the school was dependent upon all 
students accessing and participating in spoken English as the primary mode of 
instruction. As Jacob was not able to comply with this requirement he was not able to 
access instruction, and consequently, was not able to attend the school. 
 
Justice Madgwick then had to consider whether the proposed model of support for 
Jacob was a reasonable accommodation of his educational needs. The parents argued 
the model was not reasonable because: 
 
• Jacob was dependent on Auslan; note-taking had limited effectiveness;  
• they had offered $15,000.00 to mitigate any financial strain caused by 
Jacob’s enrolment; and 
• an important consideration involved Jacob attending a religious secondary 
school with his friends and colleagues.  
 
The CEO counter argued by claiming that: 
 
• Jacob was a ‘total communicator’ and not Auslan dependent;  
• the long term goal was to make him an independent learner; 
• the model of support considered the wishes of the parents and was 
proposed by professionals in the field;  
• the offer of a grant from the parents was not acceptable; and 
• the model of support did not ultimately rule out the possibility of an 
Auslan interpreter.  
 
While finding that the requirements, expectations or conditions established on 
enrolment were ‘not reasonable’ within the terms of the Act, and that the school had 
in fact indirectly discriminated against Jacob, Madgwick J commended the open 
enrolment policy of the CEO as consistent with the intent of the disability 
discrimination legislation. He proposed the case involved individual mistakes made in 
good faith rather than systemic discrimination. He also found the CEO had 
underestimated the importance of Auslan for Jacob’s communication and that, at least 
for the first few years of secondary school, Auslan would be an integral part of 
Jacob’s learning and socializing. Madgwick J also claimed the CEO had not made any 
determined effort to find or train an Auslan interpreter and therefore had no intention 
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of including Auslan in the model of support at any stage. Further to these findings, the 
school had made this intention clear to the parents when they rejected the offer to 
assist in finding and training a teacher or teacher aide in Auslan or to find volunteers 
who may be able to assist Jacob. 
 
In Travers v New South Wales69 Raphael FM considered a requirement or condition 
that a student in a particular class utilise the toilet in another building, rather than a 
toilet outside her classroom (which was available to another student with a disability). 
This was a requirement with which the applicant, a student with a disability that 
caused incontinence, could not comply because the student was unable to reach the 
toilet in time to avoid an accident. Raphael found the requirement unreasonable 
having considered the perspective of the applicant, the school and other students. 
 
Another relevant case which illustrates indirect discrimination is Scott v Telstra Corp 
Ltd.70 Telstra had a blanket policy of providing standard handsets for telephones but 
refused to provide any alternate telecommunications devices, including 
teletypewriters, for people with hearing impairments. Telstra argued that the service it 
provided was the telephone network and that the provision of handsets was additional 
to that service. However the HREOC found that the service provided was 
communication over the network and that the requirement that the network be 
accessed by standard handsets was clearly one with which a disproportionate number 
of people with profound hearing loss could not comply and which was patently 
unreasonable in the circumstances. The refusal to provide people with profound 
hearing loss with teletypewriters therefore amounted to indirect discrimination.  
 
A prominent case in this area is that of Waters & Ors v The Public Transport 
Corporation71 where changes were made to the Victorian public transport system 
which included the introduction of ‘scratch’ tickets and the removal of conductors 
from trams. The complainants were made up of physically and intellectually disabled 
transport users. The Equal Opportunity Board of Victoria in the first instance held that 
the complainants were unable to comply with the requirements to use scratch tickets 
and the High Court later agreed that to use such tickets imposed a requirement that a 
person had sufficient mental capacity to understand the system. The scratch tickets 
also indirectly discriminated against blind people as it imposed a condition that a 
person could see to use the system. The Board also held that the removal of the 
conductors imposed a condition that the complainants could ‘use trams without the 
assistance of conductors’,72 a condition that some of the complainants could not 
comply with because of their physical disabilities. This was also endorsed by the High 
Court. The case however was referred by the High Court back to the Board for a 
consideration of the respondent’s financial situation which was not originally taken 





                                                 
69 (2001) 163 FLR 99. 
70 [1995] EOC 92-717.  
71 (1990) EOC 92-293; (1991) 173 CLR 349. 
72 Waters v Public Transport Corporation (1991-1992) 173 CLR 349, per Mason CJ and Gaudron J at 
361-362 (Deane J agreeing at 382); Dawson & Toohey JJ at 393. 
 20 
INDIRECT DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION AND UNIVERSITIES 
 
In the context of education, particularly with respect to universities, a common 
method of student assessment of academic knowledge is by way of time-limited 
written examinations. If this were the only method of assessment available, it could be 
seen to be indirectly discriminatory against students who, because of their disability, 
would find it impossible to demonstrate their true academic knowledge due to the 
time constraints, whereas a substantial proportion of students without a disability 
would be able to comply with this requirement. University, policies and practices 
relating to methods of assessment may need to be reviewed in order to mitigate the 
potential for claims of unlawful indirect discrimination.73 In Hinchcliffe v University 
of Sydney74 the court considered a claim of indirect discrimination, where the 
applicant student, who was vision impaired, claimed that the university indirectly 
discriminated against her by imposing a condition or requirement that the applicant 
participate in her course without all course materials being provided in a format 
suitable to her needs. In relation to the ‘requirement or condition’, Driver FM held 
that for the purposes of s 6 of the DDA: 
 
the relevant requirement or condition must be one imposed upon not only the 
applicant but also on the class of other persons to whom the applicant is to be 
compared … I adopt the description by Drummond J in Sluggett v Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2002] FCA 987 (2002)123 FCR 
561 at [56]: ‘the concept of a requirement or condition with which the aggrieved 
party is required to comply involves the notion of compulsion or obligation 
[original emphasis retained]’ ... The applicant had characterised the obligation 
[emphasis added] as an obligation to receive course material in only one format 
... The relevant requirement or condition … is, in my view, the requirement or 
condition imposed by the university that students deal with course materials 
provided by the university in a single or standard format that the university 
chose to provide to all students. In other words, students were generally 
expected to either read course materials in the format that they were given to 
them or seek themselves to convert those materials into a different format which 
was preferred by them…as in the case of Waters it was a requirement which 
potentially might impact adversely upon the applicant by reason of her 
disability.75
 
Driver FM held that the comparator base group for the purposes of section 6 (a) to be 
the group of students undertaking the same degree course as the applicant at the time 
she was undertaking it, a substantial proportion of whom were not vision impaired 
and could comply with the condition. In terms of whether the applicant could comply 
with the university’s requirements, Driver FM held that generally she could: 
 
The need for Ms Hinchcliffe to reformat material probably inconvenienced her, 
relative to students who did not suffer from her disability. That is a relevant 
issue for the purposes of s 22 (2) (c) of the DDA. However, for the purposes of  
                                                 
73 Most Universities provide alternatives to time-limited exams. See Curtin University’s general policy 
at Counselling and Health Services homepage (www.counselling.curtin.edu.au/disability2.html) and 
assessment policy (www.policies.curtin.edu.au/documents/assessment_policy.doc).  
74 [2004] FMCA 85. 
75 At 106, 107, 108, 109. 
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s 6 (c) of the DDA the inconvenience suffered by the applicant did not approach 
the standard necessary to establish an inability to comply with the university’s 
requirement or condition. The standard requires that the applicant prove a 
‘serious disadvantage’ with the result that the applicant could not ‘meaningfully 
participate’ in the course of study for which she had been accepted: Catholic 
Education Office v Clarke at [66] & [126].76
 
In terms of whether the requirement was reasonable in the circumstances, Driver FM 
held that the existence of a disability services officer who provided assistance to the 
applicant whenever sought (although at times imperfectly) rendered the University’s 
requirement reasonable. In conclusion Driver FM found the claim under section 6 had 
failed and it was therefore unnecessary to consider whether the University had 
breached s 22 (2) (a) or (c) of the DDA. 
 
Another indirect discrimination case involving a university is that of W v Flinders 
University of South Australia.77 One of the primary issues dealt with in W was 
whether the reasonable adjustment the complainant requested to accommodate her 
disability compromised the academic integrity of the course she was enrolled in. The 
complainant had sought an adjustment to the schedule of a teaching practicum and the 
University had refused based on its belief that a minimum format of the practicum 
was an essential requirement of the course. The University had adapted the practicum 
format previously, but advised it could not adapt the practicum in the way the 
complainant requested. Commissioner McEvoy found that the requirement or 
condition imposed was compliance with the curriculum and the assessment 
requirements associated with each subject. In terms of section 6 (a) the Commissioner 
held that a substantially higher proportion of persons without the complainant’s 
symptoms would be able to comply with the requirement without any 
accommodations as sought by the complainant. In terms of reasonableness, the 
Commissioner respected the fact that the University must maintain the academic 
integrity of its courses, and although it must provide reasonable accommodation to 
persons with disabilities, this did not mean that the university was obliged to forgo the 
academic requirements of its courses for people with disabilities. On this basis, the 
condition was held to be reasonable. In fact the Commissioner was satisfied that the 
University made such accommodation as could be made that were consistent with the 
academic integrity of the course. 
 
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS, SERVICES OR FACILITIES 
 
In determining whether circumstances are ‘not materially different’ for the purposes 
of section 5 (1) of the DDA, an adjustment must be made for any accommodation or 
services required by a person with a disability so as the disabled person can 
participate in the particular activity. Section 5 (2) of the DDA provides that for the 
purposes of the comparison required by section 5 (1) the circumstances in which a 
person treats or would treat another person with a disability are not materially 
different because of the fact that different accommodation or services may be required 
by the person with a disability. 
 
                                                 
76 At 115. 
77 [1998] HREOCA. 
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Sir Ronald Wilson, the then Commissioner of the HREOC, acknowledged that people 
with disabilities may require different treatment to achieve equality: 
 
It will be remembered that s 5 (2) of the Act ensures that it is not just a question 
of treating the person with a disability in the same way as other people are 
treated; it is to be expected that the existence of the disability may require the 
person to be treated differently from the norm; in other words that some 
reasonable adjustment be made to accommodate the disability.78
 
In the context of education, the HREOC has interpreted section 5 (2) of the DDA to 
mean that institutions must provide ‘different accommodations or services’ to enable 
a person to participate in a course of study or gain access to educational goods, 
services of facilities. The provision of these different accommodations or services for 
people with disabilities is sometimes referred to as making ‘reasonable adjustment’. 
Failure to respond adequately to a request for an adjustment might result in a claim of 
discrimination.79
 
This interpretation of the DDA is contentious because the term ‘reasonable 
adjustment’ does not appear in the DDA and thus the obligation to make reasonable 
adjustments has been questioned in several cases, most notably the Purvis case.80 The 
Purvis case clarifies that the DDA creates no general obligation upon organisations to 
make reasonable adjustments to accommodate the needs of people with disabilities. 
Prior to Purvis there appeared to be a belief that the DDA provided such an 
obligation, notwithstanding that the term ‘reasonable adjustments’ did not appear.81  
 
In Purvis McHugh and Kirby JJ stated: 
 
It is not accurate … to say that s 5 (2) of the Act imposes an obligation to 
provide accommodation. No matter how important a particular accommodation 
may be for a disabled person or disabled person generally, failure to provide it is 
not a breach of the Act per se. Rather, s 5 (2) has the effect that a discriminator 
does not necessarily escape a finding of discrimination by asserting that the 
actual circumstances involved applied equally to those with and without 
disabilities. No doubt as a practical matter the discriminator may have to take 
steps to provide the accommodation to escape a finding of discrimination. But 
that is different from asserting that the Act imposes an obligation to provide 
accommodation for the disabled. 
 
Thus the High Court decision of Purvis has questioned the presumption that the DDA 
implies that reasonable adjustments must be made in order to avoid discriminating 
against people with disabilities, and the Court appears to have narrowed significantly 
the protection that the Act was thought to provide.82  
 
In its review of the DDA, the Productivity Commission noted that the issue of 
reasonable adjustments generated significant comment from participants. In essence, 
                                                 
78 AJ & J v A School (No 1) (1998) EOC 92-948, Ibid 78,313. 
79 Productivity Commission Report, 52. 
80 Productivity Commission Report, 52. 
81 R. Davern, DDA Review (2004)  FindLaw website. 
82 Productivity Commission Report, 189. 
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the Commission noted the High Court position in Purvis. For an excerpt of the 
Commission’s report with respect to reasonable adjustments, refer to the Appendix. 
 
The DDA does not specify the types of adjustments required to remove 
discrimination. What exactly constitutes ‘reasonable adjustments’ is determined on a 
case by case basis and is dependant on the particular circumstances. Educational 
institutions must make ‘reasonable adjustments’ if a person with a disability meets the 
essential entry requirements, but needs these adjustments in order to perform essential 
course-work.83 This is so that students with disabilities are able to participate and 
have the same opportunities as those who do not have a disability. In other words, 
adjustments must be made in terms of the university’s programs, facilities and 
procedures that would result in fair and equitable outcomes for students, thereby 
enabling them to partake in the course.  
 
REASONABLE ADJUSTMENTS IN THE UNIVERSITY CONTEXT 
 
It would seem clear from the decision in W v Flinders University that the academic 
standards which the DDA will not require to be changed can include standards which 
are connected with subsequent fitness to practice a profession. There is no imposition 
by the DDA of a disconnection between academic courses and their professional 
application if genuine academic requirements are structured around professional 
requirements. That is, if a course is designed to teach and test abilities which are 
based on the entry requirements for a profession, the DDA does not require changes 
to the course requirements, even though a less professionally focussed course might 
have been open to a wider range of students with disabilities.84
 
None of this is to prejudge the issue of whether a particular student can or cannot 
meet relevant course requirements, including with provision of equipment, assistance 
or other modifications which can be provided without unjustifiable hardship and 
without compromising academic standards. Some adjustments, such as provision of 
course materials in alternative formats would not appear to raise any issues of 
academic standards. Other adjustments however, such as being excused from 
performing a practical task, could well call into question whether the student has 
mastered and demonstrated the skills which the course is designed to teach and test, 
depending on the nature of the course.85
 
In some cases it may not be clear in advance whether a student with a disability can or 
cannot meet course requirements, until the student and the university have discussed 
possible difficulties and adaptations. The draft education standards (see ‘Recent 
developments’ below) if introduced, are likely to require some process of consultation 
before decisions are made on what adjustments are possible to accommodate a 
student’s disability. A process of consultation before deciding that a student or 
prospective student cannot fulfil course requirements likewise seems an important 
step in avoiding unlawfully discriminatory decisions under the existing DDA 
provisions.86
 
                                                 
83 HREOC Disability Rights, DDA Guide: Getting and Education. 
84 ‘Disability Rights’ Frequently asked questions: Education (2002) at <www.hreoc.gov.au>. 
85 ‘Disability Rights’ Frequently asked questions: Education (2002) at <www.hreoc.gov.au>. 
86 ‘Disability Rights’ Frequently asked questions: Education (2002) at <www.hreoc.gov.au>. 
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The DDA exempts ‘special measures’ for people with disabilities.87 This means it is 
not unlawful to do an act that is reasonably intended to provide people with 
disabilities with goods or access to facilities, services or opportunities or grants, 
benefits or programs to meet their special needs. In education, the DDA at s 22 (3) 
allows institutions that cater wholly or partly for people with particular types of 
disability to discriminate against people who do not have that disability. For example, 





In the area of employment, section 15 of the DDA makes disability discrimination 
unlawful in decisions relating to who should be employed, trained, promoted, 
transferred or dismissed, and how much an employee should be paid. However in 
recruitment and dismissal situations, employees must be able to carry out the 
‘inherent requirements’ of the particular employment. These are taken to be those 
activities essential to the completion of a particular task.88 When it is applicable, the 
inherent requirements test must be carried out in conjunction with the unjustifiable 
hardship provisions for making adjustments for people with disabilities. In practice 
this means that where an inherent requirements test is relevant, the employer can only 
reject a candidate (or dismiss an employee) for either being unable to fulfil the 
inherent requirements of the job, or being able to fulfil the inherent requirements only 
if the employer makes reasonable adjustments that would not be required by a person 
without a disability, which would cause the employer unjustifiable hardship.89 In the 
case of X v The Commonwealth90 McHugh J considered the concept of ‘inherent 
requirements’ and stated: 
 
Whether something is an ‘inherent requirement’ of a particular employment for 
the purposes of the Act depends on whether it was an ‘essential element’ of the 
particular employment. However, the inherent requirements of employment 
embrace much more than the physical ability to carry out the physical tasks 
encompassed by the particular employment … carrying out the employment 
without endangering the safety of other employees is an inherent requirement of 
any employment… 
 
There is no equivalent ‘inherent requirements’ clause in relation to education in the 
DDA. However, academic entry and assessment criteria are regarded as an ‘essential 
element’ of the reasonable requirements that all students must meet in their studies.91 
The HREOC confirmed this in the case of W v Flinders University. Commissioner 
McEvoy stated: 
                                                 
87 Section 45. 
88 Productivity Commission Report, 51. 
89 Productivity Commission Report, 51. 
90 (1999) 200 CLR 1992. 
91 Productivity Commission Report, 51. 
 25 
 
It is (in part) in this respect that the University must maintain the academic 
integrity of all its courses and although it must provide appropriate 
accommodations to persons with disabilities so that they are not thereby 
precluded from undertaking such studies as they choose at University, this does 
not of course mean that the University is obliged to forgo the academic 
requirements of its courses for people with disabilities. It is these considerations 
which must be taken into account in considering what is ‘reasonable having 
regard to circumstances of the case’. The circumstances of this case included the 
consideration that the requirements or condition relates to assessment leading to 
the conferral of a degree. Among the circumstances to be taken into account 
therefore are those which relate to the issue of academic integrity. This is not to 
accept the complainant’s argument that the University is assuming that she 
wishes to, or will, become, a full time teacher: it is the conferral of the degree 
with which the University is concerned. Further, however, the maintenance of 
its academic integrity on a broad basis is absolutely fundamental to any 
University’s overall function and credibility.92
 
The draft education standards (see ‘Recent developments’ below) clarify that inherent 
academic requirements must be maintained equally for all students in enrolment and 
assessment.  
 
If it can be demonstrated that a potential student’s disability may place the potential 
student or others at risk while partaking in the course, then a decision not to admit the 
potential student may not be seen as discriminatory. For example, if an educational 
institution refused to enrol a student in their nursing course because the student had 
epilepsy, the institution may be seen to discriminate directly against that person on the 
ground of a disability, particularly if it could not be established that the condition had 
no effect on the ability to complete the course. If however it could be demonstrated 
that the student’s medical condition may place her, or others at risk while studying, 
working in laboratories and completing hospital-based internships, then such a 
decision may not be seen as direct discrimination. The important lesson from the 
cases is that the student’s condition must be specifically and personally assessed and 
the decision of the institution should not be based on a general enquiry about the 




An educational institution may avoid a finding of unlawful discrimination if it can 
demonstrate that to comply with the DDA an unjustifiable hardship would be imposed 
upon the institution. The appropriate approach by a court to the concept of 
unjustifiable hardship is first to determine whether or not the respondent has 
discriminated against the complainant and then determine whether or not the 
respondent is able to make out the defence of unjustifiable hardship.93 Where this 
defence is raised, the tribunal or court must undertake an individualised 
investigation.94
 
                                                 
92 At 50. 
93 Sluggett v HREOC (2002) 123 FCR 561, 568 [24]-[25] (Drummond J). 
94 A Three-Dimensional Approach to Operationalising Human Rights, 271. 
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Section 22 (4) of the DDA provides that it is not unlawful to refuse or fail to accept a 
person’s application for admission as a student at an educational institution where the 
person, if admitted as a student by the educational authority, would require services or 
facilities that are not required by students who do not have a disability and the 
provision of which would impose ‘unjustifiable hardship’ on the educational 
authority. Thus, although the DDA does not expressly require that ‘reasonable 
adjustments’ are to be made by educational institutions (as discussed above), it does 
limit the different accommodation or services that an educational institution must take 
into account to a level at which an unjustifiable hardship would be imposed upon the 
institution.95 The defence of unjustifiable hardship as set out in the DDA has the 
effect of ‘capping’ the obligation to make adjustments so that the response is 
reasonably proportionate to the circumstances of the case. 
 
This then would seem to imply an obligation to make adjustments where they would 
not result in unjustifiable hardship, although as noted in the Purvis case by the 
minority, this obligation might only be enforceable in the breach. Thus, if a person 
makes no adjustments or insufficient adjustments and a complaint is made against 
them, they might not be able to use this defence.96  
 
Currently, the defence is only available in considering whether or not to accept a 
person’s application at enrolment to the educational institution. Once a disabled 
student is admitted, the defence is no longer available which means that the 
educational institution is obliged to make the necessary accommodations for the 
disabled student. For example in the Hills Grammar School case referred to above, 
the school refused to enrol Scarlett Finney on the grounds that the provision of 
support to her would have caused the school unjustifiable hardship. Had the school 
enrolled Scarlett, such an argument would not have been available and the school 
would have had to provide whatever was reasonably needed to enable Scarlett to 
participate.97
 
This limitation in the coverage of unjustifiable hardship has caused problems and 
created uncertainty for educational providers when dealing with people with 
disabilities post-enrolment because under the current provisions, post-enrolment 
situations are not covered by the defence.98  
 
HOW IS UNJUSTIFIABLE HARDSHIP DETERMINED? 
 
Section 11 of the DDA provides that in determining what constitutes unjustifiable 
hardship, all relevant circumstances of the particular case are to be taken into account.  
 
The Hills Grammar School case provides an excellent illustration of the application of 
section 11. As noted above, Scarlett Finney had spina bifida. Her parents had applied 
to enrol her for kindergarten at the Hills Grammar School which refused the 
enrolment based on unjustifiable hardship grounds. The majority of the evidence 
submitted by both parties concerned whether the provision of services or facilities 
required by Scarlett would impose unjustifiable hardship. The school admitted 
                                                 
95 Productivity Commission Report, 52. 
96 Productivity Commission Report, 188. 
97A Three-Dimensional Approach to Operationalising Human Rights, 272. 
98 Productivity Commission Report, 205. 
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directly discriminating against Scarlett on the ground of her disability, but claimed 
that inadequate school resources would result in the school being unable to meet 
Scarlett’s needs. The HREOC considered a large number of possible factors relevant 
to the situation including additional training of teachers, teachers’ aides, classroom 
assistance, curriculum modifications, school accessibility, excursions, toiletry needs 
and modifications, the availability of funding and the school’s financial 
circumstances. Commissioner Innes weighed the benefits and detriments (as required 
by section 11 of the DDA), for Scarlett, the Finney family, the school and the 
community if Scarlett were not to attend the school. On balance the Commissioner 
found that it would not have caused unjustifiable hardship to the school to have 
enrolled Scarlett in kindergarten. This case highlights the fact that no single factor 
alone is likely to constitute grounds for claiming unjustifiable hardship. All relevant 
factors are weighed up to determine, in the circumstances, whether unjustifiable 
hardship exists.  
 
Importantly, it was noted in Hills Grammar School that the enquiries made by the 
school to assess the adjustments required for Scarlett were not satisfactory. 
Commissioner Innes observed that the decision not to enrol Scarlett had been made 
taking into account the assessment for a child with spina bifida generally rather than 
specifically for Scarlett and that given the implications of the condition are quite 
varied, to base Scarlett’s condition on a worst case scenario and thus the level of 
adjustment required on that scenario, was inappropriate. This aspect is reflected in the 
judgment of McHugh and Kirby JJ in the Purvis case: 
  
the elimination of discrimination against people with disabilities is not furthered 
by ‘equal’ treatment that ignores their individual disabilities. The Act imposes a 
prima facie requirement on persons falling within its terms to accommodate the 
disabilities of each disabled person in order to achieve real – not notional – 
equality. In this context, ‘accommodation’ means the making of suitable 
provision for the disabled person.99
 
Section 11 sets out in general terms the relevant factors to be taken into account, 
namely: 
 
(a) the nature of the benefit or detriment likely to accrue or be suffered by any 
person concerned.  
 
In matters before the HREOC, when it sat as a tribunal, a number of decisions 
considered that the group of ‘any persons concerned’ extends beyond the immediate 
complainant and respondent.100 In the Hills Grammar School case, the finding of the 
Commissioner was expressed by him to have been based on a weighing of his 
findings of fact and a consideration of the benefits and detriments to all concerned 
which included Scarlett, her parents, the school and the community. The nature of 
these benefits and detriments included appointment of new teaching staff, additional 
training of teachers, toiletry needs and modifications, classroom modifications, 
transportation issues, financial circumstances and availability of funding.  
 
                                                 
99 at [86] to [89] 2003. 
100 Francey v Hilton Hotels of Australia Pty Ltd (1997) EOC 92-903, Ibid, 77,452 and Cooper v 
Holiday Coast Cinema, Unreported, HREOC, Commissioner Kein, 29 August 1997.  
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In other cases before HREOC, a number of decisions considered s 11(a), which 
requires consideration be given to ‘the nature of the benefit or detriment likely to 
accrue or be suffered by any persons concerned’. In Francey v Hilton Hotels of 
Australia Pty Ltd101 for example, Commissioner Innes considered a complaint 
brought by a person with asthma (and her associate) that the respondent’s policy of 
allowing people to smoke in their nightclub made it a condition of access to those 
premises that patrons be able to tolerate environmental tobacco smoke. This was a 
condition with which the complainant could not comply. In finding that the defence of 
unjustifiable hardship was not made out, Commissioner Innes considered the benefits 
and detriments to the complainants, the respondent, staff and potential staff, patrons 
and potential patrons of the nightclub. He stated: 
 
Having weighed all of the above factors, I conclude that a finding that the 
respondent’s conduct unlawfully discriminates against the complainants would 
not cause unjustifiable hardship. The capacity for all Australians, with or 
without a disability, to participate as far as possible in all aspects of community 
life must be the paramount consideration. When the benefits set out above to 
other patrons and staff, as well as to the respondent itself, are added, the scales 
are weighted heavily. Whilst there are clearly consequences which cause some 
hardship to the respondent, financial and otherwise, they are unable to tip the 
scales. The financial consequences depend very much on the course chosen to 
remedy the discrimination and even taken at their worst are not unduly large in 
the context of the respondent’s overall revenue. Further, the respondent will be 
required to address the same issues in five years time by the NSW legislation 
already referred to.102
 
In Cooper v Holiday Coast Cinema103 the complaint concerned the condition that 
patrons of a cinema access the premises by way of stairs. This was a condition with 
which the complainant, who used a wheelchair, could not comply. Commissioner 
Keim considered s 11(a) and stated: 
 
I am of the view that the phrase should be interpreted broadly. I am of the view 
that it is appropriate not only to look to the complainants themselves but also 
their families and to other persons with disabilities restricting their mobility who 
might, in the future, be able to use the respondent’s cinema. In the same way, in 
terms of the effect of the order on the respondent, it is appropriate for me to look 
at the hardship that might be suffered by the shareholders of the respondent; its 
employees; and also its current and potential customers. The latter groups of 
people are particularly important in terms of financial hardship from an order 
forcing the cinema complex to close.104
 
In Scott v Telstra Corporation Ltd,105 the issue of unjustifiable hardship concerned the 
provision of a tele-typewriter (‘TTY’) to customers of the respondent who had 
profound hearing loss. The respondent argued that it was relevant to consider costs 
                                                 
101 Ibid, 77,452. 
102 At 4. 
103 Unreported, HREOC, Commissioner Keim, 29 August 1997. 
104 Ibid 7. 
105 (1995) EOC 92-717, 78,402 Sir Ronald Wilson. 
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relating to its potential liability if it was required to provide other products to facilitate 
access to its services by people with disabilities. The argument was dismissed.  
 
The respondent has also provided figures on a best and worst case basis of its 
potential liability if it has to provide other products as well as TTYs. I do not 
consider these figures relevant. The only relevant factors that have to be 
considered are those referable to the supply of TTYs and the resultant revenue to 
the respondent. It is quite wrong to confuse the issue of unjustifiable hardship 
arising from the supply of TTYs to persons with a profound hearing loss with 
possible hardship arising from other potential and unproved liabilities. It follows 
that the reliance by the respondent on the cost of providing products other than 
the TTY to persons other than persons with a profound hearing loss to show 
unjustifiable hardship is an erroneous application of s 11 of the DDA.106
 
The Commission agreed that the service offered by Telstra should include the 
provision of access to the telecommunications network. Commissioner Wilson said 
that the services enable communication over the network to take place. The 
Commission rejected outright Telstra’s argument that the benefits to the class 
members of having access to the telecommunications system were not relevant to the 
assessment of unjustifiable hardship. The Commission in deciding on the question of 
unjustifiable hardship considered:  
 
• the financial circumstances of Telstra;  
• the cost of supplying TTYs (estimated to be $5,600,000);  
• extended time period over which people would take up the opportunity to 
rent TTYs;  
• the revenue to Telstra from renting TTYs and from increased use of the 
telecommunications system; and  
• the enormous benefit to be gained by Mr Scott and other deaf people 
through being able to use the telecommunications system.  
 
The Commission refused to be influenced in its decision about unjustifiable hardship 
by the argument that to make a decision in favour of the Mr Scott and Disabled 
Persons International (DPI) would open a ‘floodgate’ to complaints. The Commission 
decided that Telstra had indirectly discriminated against Mr Scott and members of the 
class represented by DPI.  
 
The Commission rejected the argument that to not discriminate would cause an 
unjustifiable hardship on Telstra. Telstra was ordered to supply a voucher for value 
$600 to purchase a TTY to each class member who did not qualify for a TTY under 
another scheme. If more than one class member lived in the same household only one 
of them could qualify for the voucher.  
 
Since the decision, Telstra have agreed to provide this system not only for profoundly 
deaf Australians, but also to anyone in Australia with a severe hearing loss or speech 
impairment.  
 
                                                 
106 Ibid. 
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In Purvis the High Court noted that safety considerations of other students and 
teachers should be taken into account when determining unjustifiable hardship.  
 
The nature of the detriment likely to be suffered by any persons concerned, if the 
student was admitted, would comprehend consideration of threats to the safety and 
welfare of other pupils, teachers and aides. Any negative impact that may be caused 
by the presence of a student with a disability in a mainstream class is a proper matter 
to be considered when making a decision on whether that individual student can be 
admitted. Thus, the Act provides for a balance to be struck between the rights of the 
disabled child and those of other pupils and, for that matter, teaching staff.107
 
b) The effect of the disability of a person concerned.  
 
For example, flexible teaching methods to accommodate a student with a disability 
may enhance learning for other students (e.g., other students may learn sign language 
to improve their communication with a student with a hearing impairment). 
Conversely a student with a learning disability may require more teaching resources 
which detract from the resources available for other students. 
 
In the case of Hills Grammar School, Commissioner Innes set out the benefits and 
detriments to be ‘accrued or suffered by any person concerned’. In terms of the 
benefits for the complainant Scarlett Finney, these included a unique learning 
environment which would enhance her learning process and the multi-disciplinary 
approach of the school which would enhance the management skills required by 
Scarlett in order to operate within the timetable of multiple teachers and class 
environments. For the school, the changes to improve accessibility of the school to 
Scarlett would have improved the school for everyone using it and any additional 
teacher training would have meant that teachers were better qualified. For the 
community, Commissioner Innes stated: 
 
The quality of life of a community is improved by the inclusion of all persons in 
that community. Therefore, including Scarlett in the School community would 
have improved the quality of life for that community. Of course, the School 
community includes in this sense all of the families linked with the School, and 
this is therefore a much broader benefit.108
 
In terms of detriments, the Commissioner noted that these would mostly be directed at 
the school in additional running and capital costs which overall were considered to be 
a minor detriment. 
 
(c) The financial circumstances and the estimated amount of expenditure 
required to be made by the person claiming unjustifiable hardship.  
 
For example, the cost of providing a modified computer for a person with a visual 
impairment may be beyond the financial resources of a small secretarial training 
college but is a minor expense for a university. In Hills Grammar School, a detailed 
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estimate was made by the respondent; however the HREOC held that the respondent 
greatly overstated the costings. 
 
(d) In the case of the provision of services, or the making available of facilities, 
an action plan given to the Commission under s 64 (4).109
 
The concept of unjustifiable hardship suggests that some hardship will be justifiable. 
In Finney Commissioner Innes stated: 
 
The concept of ‘unjustifiable hardship’ connotes much more than just hardship 
of the respondent. The objects of the [DDA] make it clear that elimination of 
discrimination as far as possible is the legislation’s purpose. Considered in that 
context, it is reasonable to expect that [a respondent] should have to undergo 
some hardship … the nub of the issue is whether such hardship was 
unjustifiable.110
 
It follows that an educational institution must thoroughly assess the student’s request 
for adjustments before asserting any unjustifiable hardship. The HREOC is not 
required to consider the defence of unjustifiable hardship unless there is detailed 
evidence in support of unjustifiable hardship. The Commissioner is likely to insist 
upon evidence concerning each of the relevant factors listed above.  
 
ONUS OF PROVING UNJUSTIFIABLE HARDSHIP 
 
The DDA and various State legislation does not expressly stipulate who bears the 
burden of proving unjustifiable hardship.111 This issue was discussed in the Hills 
Grammar School case where the complainant relied on Scott v Telstra Corp Ltd112 
and argued that the burden lies with the respondent that is, the party who seeks the 
protection of the defence. The complainant also submitted however, that the preferred 
course of gathering information about the needs of a spina-bifida child is a combined 
effort between the parents of the child and the school concerned. 
 
The respondent school argued that the burden of establishing the services and 
facilities needed by Scarlett should be shared between the parties through an 
interactive process. In his findings Commissioner Innes stated: 
 
The onus of proof clearly shifts to the respondent to establish unjustifiable 
hardship once the complainant has proved that discrimination has occurred … 
Courts and Tribunal in Australia have been consistent in this approach since the 
commencement of disability discrimination legislation. However, I agree with 
                                                 
109 Any organisation can submit a voluntary action plan under the DDA to be registered by HREOC. If 
a discrimination complaint is subsequently made against the organisation, its voluntary action plan 
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111 The Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) at s 109 and Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) at s 123 
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112 (1995) EOC 92-717 at 78,401. 
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the submissions of both parties that the most appropriate way to approach the 
process is as a ‘combined effort’ or a ‘shared burden’.113
 
The Commissioner’s approach in this regard was accepted on appeal in the Federal 
Court. However, Tamberlin J stated: 
 
The Commissioner accepted the submission of the School that the burden of 
proving the services and facilities was a shared burden, and he proceeded on the 
basis that there was a shared burden of proof in relation to unjustifiable hardship 
… the Commissioner was entitled to approach the matter by evaluating all the 
material before him without ultimately placing any substantial emphasis on the 
onus of proof.114
 
Tamberlin J’s comment is interesting because he suggests that Commissioner Innes 
proceeded on the basis that the burden of proving unjustifiable hardship is a shared 
one. However, whilst Commissioner Innes acknowledged that it is a shared burden 
with respect to establishing what types of services and facilities are required by a 
disabled student, this is in contrast to proving that unjustifiable hardship exists and in 
this respect, Commissioner Innes did not depart from the Scott v Telstra principle 
whereby the onus of proving unjustifiable hardship rests with the respondent. 
Tamberlin J’s view may possibly be seen as a departure from this principle and 
suggests a somewhat illogical notion of shared burden of proof, given that the parties 





In April 2004, the Productivity Commission submitted a detailed review of the DDA 
to the Commonwealth Attorney General, Phillip Ruddock. The terms of reference of 
the review included the effectiveness of the DDA and whether its objects were being 
met, and identification of relevant alternatives to the legislation including non-
legislative approaches.  
 
The Productivity Commission suggested a significant number of new inclusions and 
many amendments to the DDA. To date, most of these have not been acted upon by 
the Federal Government. Some of the recommendations made included: 
 
• That the defence of unjustifiable hardship be extended to all stages in the 
educational process, not just at enrolment. The original provision has 
always been considered a drafting error and this recommendation has been 
adopted by the Government into a Bill proposing amendment to the DDA 
(see below). 
• The Commission considers that the task of eliminating discrimination 
cannot be achieved in the absence of an express duty in the DDA to make 
reasonable adjustments. The Commission suggested either amending the 
definition of direct discrimination to include a requirement to provide the 
‘different accommodations or services’ (which is already mentioned in s 5 
                                                 
113 At 7.2. 
114 Hills Grammar School v HREOC [2000] FCA 658, at 24 and 38. 
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(2)). This however would still express the duty in an indirect manner. 
Alternatively the Commission suggested that a specific duty to make 
reasonable adjustments be included, putting the Act on a more proactive 
basis by focusing on what needs to be done to avoid charges of direct or 
indirect discrimination. The defence of unjustifiable hardship would still 
apply. The Commission also suggested that the DDA be amended to 
include upon whom the duty to provide the adjustments would fall.115 The 
Commission believes that such a duty would enable those with disabilities 
to start at the same notional ‘starting line’ as people without disabilities. It 
would not mean that a person with a disability is given an advantage over 
others who do not have a disability; rather it would remove a source of 
disadvantage faced by them that arises from their disability. For example, 
the provision of a screen reader for a student with a visual impairment 
might address the disadvantage faced by that person, but does not mean 
that that person is receiving preferential treatment because the screen 
reader would be of no use to someone without a visual impairment. The 
duty to make adjustments amendment provisions have been introduced 
into Parliament in a Bill (discussed below) which seeks to amend the DDA 
by inserting after s 31 (1): 
 
(1A) For the avoidance of doubt, disability standards may require a person or 
body dealing with persons with disabilities to put in place reasonable 
adjustments to eliminate, as far as possible, discrimination against those persons. 
 
Part 3 of the draft education standards also deal with the requirement to 
make reasonable adjustments.  
 
There has been no proposed amendment to the DDA as to which party 
bears the burden of proving unjustifiable hardship. However, the draft 
education standards place the onus of proof as to unjustifiable hardship 
upon the ‘provider’ (educational authority). 
 
• That the definition of direct discrimination in the DDA be supplemented 
with examples (either included in the Act or in guidelines) to clarify the 
‘circumstances that are the same or not materially different’ for the 
purposes of making a comparison for s 5. The Productivity Commission 
also noted that some of the problems relating to the comparator actually 
stem from deficiencies in the definition of ‘disability’ rather the 
comparator per se.116 Additionally with regard to the definition of 
disability, the Commission recommended that it would be beneficial to 
clarify this area by way of adding a note to the Act that explains that 
behaviour that is a symptom or manifestation of a disability is part of the 
disability for the purposes of the Act, notwithstanding that this matter has 
been addressed by the High Court.117 This recommendation has to date, 
not been taken up. 
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• That the proportionality test section 6 (a) for indirect discrimination is a 
contentious issue. Anti-discrimination Acts in the ACT, NT and Tasmania 
as well as the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) and the new Age 
Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth) do not include a proportionality test. 
Instead they use a concept of ‘disadvantage’ that is similar to the 
‘unfavourable’ and ‘less favourable’ tests found in definitions of direct 
discrimination. The Commission found that the proportionality test is 
complex unnecessarily and places an unwarranted burden of proof upon 
the complainant and the Commission believes that s 6 (a) and (c) are 
sufficient to demonstrate indirect discrimination. This recommendation has 
to date, not been taken up. 
• That section 6(b) (reasonableness of requirement or condition in indirect 
discrimination) could benefit from clarification of the criteria that should 
be considered in determining whether a rule or condition is reasonable, as 
appears in some other anti-discrimination Acts such as the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) and the Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT). 
This is particularly important considering that the Productivity 
Commission has also recommended that the DDA be amended to include 
an express duty to provide ‘reasonable’ accommodations In this way the 
meaning and application of ‘reasonable’ in the context of ‘reasonable 
adjustments’ and ‘reasonable’ for the purposes of section 6 (b) can be 
distinguished. Whilst the recommendation regarding reasonable 
adjustments has been taken up, the issue of reasonableness in the context 
of indirect discrimination has to date, not been taken up. 
• The Productivity Commission also examined the issue of who should pay 
for the adjustments. Up until now the presumption has been that the 
educational institution pays. However, this may not be the most equitable 
or efficient arrangement. The Commission suggested that an additional 
clause to the list of ‘relevant circumstances’ may help to recognise the role 
of the broader community in funding adjustments. The United Kingdom’s 
DDA equivalent in respect to discrimination in employment includes as a 
factor in determining ‘reasonableness’ that regard should be given to ‘the 
availability to the employer of financial or other assistance with respect to 
taking the step’. The advantage of this provision is that the mutual 
obligations of all the parties are recognised and it puts the onus upon the 
educational institution to become aware of potential sources of funding, 
including the government and non-government organisations. In fact the 
Commission considers it appropriate for the government to play a major 
role in funding adjustments. The Productivity Commission’s 
recommendation in this regard was that the criteria for determining 
unjustifiable hardship should be expanded to include as a relevant 
circumstance, the availability of financial and other assistance. This issue 









THE EDUCATION STANDARDS 
 
Since 1995, work on the development of disability standards for education118 has been 
undertaken, led by a taskforce established by the Ministerial Council on Education, 
Employment, Training and Youth Affairs (MCEETYA). The current Federal 
Government hopes that the standards will raise public awareness of the barriers 
frequently encountered by people with disabilities in the area of education, which 
simply do not arise for other students. The standards clarify the expectation of 
students with disabilities from educational institutions so as to give more guidance to 
educational institutions on how to comply with the DDA and thus hopefully avoid 
claims of unlawful discrimination. Universities will be able to refer to these standards 
to check whether they are complying with the DDA. This makes the task of 
complying with complex legislation easier as the standards set out the types of 
measures that organisations should take in order to satisfy their obligations under the 
legislation.119 It is recommended that if an educational institution acts in accordance 
with the standards then the institution will not be in breach of the DDA. 
 
A number of key concepts were developed as underpinning the development of the 
standards. Importantly, the areas of ‘reasonable adjustment’ and ‘unjustifiable 
hardship’ were two such concepts. The High Court decision in Purvis clarified that 
the DDA creates no general obligation upon educational authorities to make 
reasonable adjustments to accommodate the needs of disabled persons. Prior to 
Purvis, it was implied that the DDA made such a provision, despite the fact that the 
term ‘reasonable adjustment’ was not even mentioned in the legislation. As discussed 
in this paper, the proposed amendment to the legislation will be such that the 
standards may require an institution to put into place reasonable adjustments.  
 
The current draft of the education standards proposes to alter the application of 
unjustifiable hardship by extending the defence to situations post-enrolment. The 
Productivity Commission’s review recommending that the extension be amended 
through the DDA and the standards and not the standards alone has been acted upon 
(see below).  
 
On 12 August 2004, the Federal Government introduced the Disability Discrimination 
Amendment (Education Standards) Bill 2004 in response to the Productivity 
Commission’s review and the draft education standards. The Bill amends the DDA to 
ensure that the standards are supported by the legislation. Additionally, the Bill 
amends the DDA to extend the defence of unjustifiable hardship to post-enrolment 
situations in education as discussed above. The Bill lapsed as it was introduced almost 
simultaneously with the announcement of the 2004 Federal Election, however in a 
media statement on 17 November 2004, it was announced that the Bill had been re-
introduced. Consequently, it will still be some time before the Bill is passed through 
Parliament. 
 
                                                 
118 Under section 31 of the DDA, the Minister may formulate disability standards in relation to 
education of persons with disabilities. Under s 32 a breach of the standards is unlawful. 




This paper has explored the application of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 
(Cth) as it relates to disability discrimination in education and the issue of the defence 
of unjustifiable hardship. 
 
The DDA was enacted as a result of growing international action to promote human 
rights and equality for people with disabilities.120 Although anti-discrimination 
legislation has existed in Australia since 1977,121 overall the legislation has been 
patchy and not all disabilities have been covered.122
 
The enactment of the DDA extends the application of disability discrimination 
principles not only to employment, but also to cover the areas of education, access to 
premises used by the public, the provision of goods, services and facilities, 
accommodation, sport, land, clubs and incorporated associations. The definition of 
disability under the DDA is comprehensive and ensures that all types of disabilities 
are covered, so that the focus is not on the nature of the person’s disability but on the 
alleged act of the discriminator. However the spotlight was put firmly back onto the 
definition of disability in the case of Purvis which confirmed that a manifestation of 
disturbed behaviour which results from an underlying disorder is part of, and satisfies 
the definition of disability for the purposes of the Act. Any departure from this 
approach would probably require legislative amendment. 
 
Discrimination can be direct or indirect and both require identification of a 
comparator in order to assess whether a person (or group of persons) has been treated 
less favourably. The issue of an appropriate comparator has been a complicated one 
since the inception of the DDA and given the result in Purvis and the fact that the 
High Court was divided on this issue, it is suggested that the issue will remain a 
contentious one. 
 
Educational institutions, including universities, must make reasonable adjustments to 
accommodate students with disabilities, notwithstanding the fact that there is no 
express duty in the DDA requiring them to do so. This lack of express duty was 
confirmed in Purvis and supported by the Productivity Commission. However it was 
also noted in Purvis that in practice the discriminator may have to take steps to 
provide the accommodation to escape a finding of discrimination. What is 
‘reasonable’ can only be determined by the particular circumstances of the case. The 
draft educations standards may require an institution to put into place reasonable 
adjustments.  
 
The provision of reasonable adjustments in the education context is subject to the 
defence of unjustifiable hardship. Previously this defence was only available at 
enrolment, however with amendment to the DDA it will apply to post-enrolment 
stages also. In determining what constitutes unjustifiable hardship, all relevant 
circumstances of the case must be taken into account. The Hills Grammar School case 
highlights that assessment based on general assumptions are not acceptable and that 
the person with the disability must be individually assessed as to the level of 
                                                 
120 Productivity Commission Report. 
121 Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW). 
122 Productivity Commission Report. 
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adjustments required. Additionally, unjustifiable hardship is not simply a question of 
financial hardship; as noted in Purvis, safety considerations of other students and 
teachers was taken into account when weighing up the nature of the determents likely 
to be suffered by any person concerned. 
 
For universities particularly, W v Flinders University confirms that academic entry 
and assessment criteria are regarded as an essential part of the reasonable 
requirements that all students must meet in their studies. The draft education 
standards clarify that inherent academic requirements must be maintained equally for 
all students in enrolment and assessment. 
 
Whilst one of the objectives of the DDA is to eliminate as far as possible, 
discrimination against persons in all areas of life, including in education, the decision 
in Purvis could be seen as being at variance with this aim. However the reality of the 
situation remains; how do educational institutions deal with a situation where a 
student’s behaviour, which results from an underlying condition, causes actual or 
potential physical and/or emotional harm to other students or teachers? How does an 
educational institution balance its legal obligations given that it must operate in an 
environment which promotes inclusiveness but in which a duty of care is owed to 
every student? It may be that the decision in Purvis reflects for now a pragmatic and 
workable approach, but one which is bound to be revisited in the future. 
 
Finally, educational institutions must keep abreast of the changes and the on-going 
development in this area of law. In particular, the new standards are of crucial 
importance in this regard and educational institutions need to be well versed in the 
standards’ compliance procedures in order to satisfy the requirements of the DDA, 





‘No issue has caused as much comment during this inquiry as ‘reasonable 
adjustments’. The many comments the Productivity Commission received on this 
subject shows that reasonable adjustments can mean different things to different 
people … There is no explicit provision in the DDA that says that adjustments must 
be made to meet the needs of people with disabilities. For example, the term 
‘reasonable adjustments’ (sometimes also called ‘reasonable accommodations’) does 
not appear anywhere in the DDA. However, various sections of the Act seem to 
imply, or have been interpreted, to require that ‘reasonable adjustments’ be made in 
certain circumstances. These include the definition of discrimination (s.5 (2)), the 
reasonableness component of the definition of indirect discrimination (s.6 (b)), and 
the unjustifiable hardship defence. 
 
The Australian Government at the time the DDA was introduced appeared to intend 
that the provision of reasonable adjustments was in fact a duty. This is evident in the 
explanatory memorandum and the second reading speech which both used the term 
‘reasonable accommodation’ in the context of unjustifiable hardship.  
 
The DDA provides that circumstances are not considered to be ‘materially different’ 
if ‘different accommodation or services’ are required by a person with a disability (s.5 
(2)). There is a long history of debate over whether or not this section implies an 
obligation to make adjustments by providing different accommodation or services. 
 
The meaning of this section has been considered variously by HREOC 
Commissioners, the Federal Court, and most recently the High Court. In one of the 
most influential cases, A School v HREOC and Anor, Mansfield J rebutted the 
respondent’s argument that the DDA did not impose a positive obligation to treat a 
person with a disability more favourably than a person without a disability. His 
Honour commented that: ‘it is not necessarily the case that, where the DDA applies to 
a particular relationship or circumstance, there is no positive obligation to provide for 
the need of a person with a disability for different or additional accommodation or 
services.’ ((1998) FCA 1437) 
 
Subsequently, HREOC Commissioner McEvoy said: 
 
the substantial effect of section 5(2) is to impose a duty on a respondent to make 
a reasonably proportionate response to the disability of the person with which it 
is dealing … so that in truth the person with a disability is not subjected to less 
favourable treatment than would a person without a disability in similar 
circumstances. (McEvoy (HREOC unreported 2000), quoted in HREOC 2003b, 
p. 75). 
 
By contrast, the opposite view—that section 5(2) does not impose a duty to provide 
the different accommodations required by a person with a disability—was found in 
Clark v Internet Resources (Commissioner Mahoney, HREOC 2000) and 
Commonwealth of Australia v Humphries ((1998) 1031 FCA). 
 
This issue came to a head when the High Court considered the Purvis case involving 
alleged discrimination against a student in a NSW school (Purvis v New South Wales 
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(Department of Education and Training) (2003) HCA 62). As noted by Lee Ann 
Basser, although the majority of judges in this case ‘did not consider the duty to make 
reasonable adjustments in any detail, the minority considered the issue in some detail’ 
(sub. DR266, p. 2). Justices McHugh and Kirby, in the minority, concluded, among 
other things, that s.5 (2) does not impose an obligation to make adjustments and that 
failure to provide adjustments is not a per se breach of the Act. They found that the 
‘failure to provide the required accommodation goes to the issue of materially 
different circumstances, not obligation’ ([2003] HCA 62). 
 
According to Lee Ann Basser, the view of McHugh and Kirby JJ is that: 
 
in the absence of an express duty to make reasonable adjustments, the Act 
operates in a negative fashion. According to McHugh and Kirby JJ there is no 
obligation to make adjustments or accommodations but a failure to make 
reasonable adjustments may lead to a finding of unlawful discrimination. (Sub. 
DR266, p. 2) 
 
Although this might not be the end of the matter (a majority of the High Court could 
presumably take a different view in a subsequent case), the Productivity Commission 
is satisfied that section 5(2) of the DDA cannot be relied upon to imply a duty to 
make adjustments.’   
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